Laos unexploded ordnance legacy

[izzix]

Forty years on, Laos reaps bitter harvest of the secret war
More than 100 countries will today sign a convention banning the use of cluster bombs. In Laos, the most bombed nation on earth, their lethal legacy is a part of daily life.

* Ian MacKinnon in Phonsavanh, Laos
* The Guardian, Wednesday 3 December 2008
* Article history

Part of a US bomber lies in a temple in Phanop village, Laos

Part of a US bomber lies in a temple in Phanop village, Laos. "We keep it here to remind the children of what happened," the monk said. "If one day we badly need money we might sell it for the scrap value." Photograph: Sean Sutton/Mines Advisory Group

The entrance to Craters restaurant is guarded by a phalanx of bombshells, each as big as a man. Opposite, the Dokkhoune hotel boasts an even finer warhead collection. For tourists who have not cottoned on, the Lao town of Phonsavanh lies at the heart of the most cluster-bombed province of the most bombed country on earth.
Ian MacKinnon visits one of the most bombed places on earth in Laos
Link to this audio

The haul of unexploded ordnance (UXO) is just a taster of that littering the countryside, or sitting in vast piles around homes and scrapyards. The deadly harvest from the US bombing of this landlocked country 30 years ago in the so-called "secret war" as the real battle raged in next-door Vietnam has become big business. Steel prices that surged on the back of soaring demand from China's go-go economy drove up scrap prices five-fold in eight years in impoverished Laos. It sent subsistence rice farmers, struggling make to ends meet amid spiralling food and fuel prices, scurrying into their fields in search of the new "cash crop".

But it comes at a high price. At least 13,000 people have been killed or maimed, either digging in fields contaminated with live bombs or, increasingly, in their quest for lucrative scrap metal. Half the casualties are young boys, most killed by exploding tennis-ball-sized cluster bomblets - christened "bombies" locally - that are everywhere.

The scale of the contamination is mind-boggling. Laos was hit by an average of one B-52 bomb-load every eight minutes, 24 hours a day, between 1964 and 1973. US bombers dropped more ordnance on Laos in this period than was dropped during the whole of the second world war. Of the 260m "bombies" that rained down, particularly on Xieng Khouang province, 80m failed to explode, leaving a deadly legacy.

Overwhelmed by the immensity of the clear-up, Laos - which has dealt with just 400,000 unexploded munitions - had resisted the signing today in Oslo of a treaty banning cluster bombs and demanding that remnants be cleared within 10 years. But the country has had a rethink and will now be a key player in the ceremony.

For Laos it could be a godsend, focusing world attention on its plight and bringing international resources to tackle the problem. With 37% of agricultural ground made unsafe by unexploded munitions in a nation where four-fifths of people farm the land, the scourge has stifled development.

Yet farmers eking out a living below the dollar-a-day poverty line have no choice. Bombs unearthed as they gingerly peck at the soil are planted around, or moved to the side of the field.

"In the end the Lao people regard lack of food as much greater threat than unexploded bombs," said David Hayter, the Lao country director of British-based Mines Advisory Group (MAG). "It's just that each UXO death is marked by a big bang, but deaths from lack of food or poor water are less noticeable."

Fatalistic acceptance of the danger is fostered by familiarity. Bomb remains are fashioned into everyday items: cluster-bomb casings become fencing; houses perch on stilts crafted from 500lb bombs; mortars with fins are used as table lamps. "People's familiarity is the most striking thing for me," said Jo Pereira, an occupational therapist with the Lao charity Cope, which fits UXO victims with prosthetic limbs. "They've lived with it for so long. Much of it is in their houses. Children think 'we've got those at home' and don't see the risks."

So when scrap metal prices rocketed many saw it as a heaven-sent opportunity to boost meagre incomes. For those unable to grow enough rice to feed their families throughout the year, there is little choice but to collect UXO scrap despite the dangers.

"People have lived with this for two generations," said Gregory Cathcart, an MAG programme officer. "They don't view it as risky. It's simply a cash crop. The problem is the main scrap on the surface is gone, so they've to dig it up which is extremely dangerous."

Cheap Vietnamese metal detectors costing as little as £7.36 boost the business. Landless families have turned full-time scrap collectors, earning up to £2.70 a day if they unearth six or seven kilos. Stumble on half a cluster bomb casing of "best Detroit steel" and they hit pay-dirt, worth £20 to £27.

No such luck for Sher Ya, 25. He plonks a plastic bag of bullet casings on the scrap dealer's scales and anxiously eyes the needle. His teenage brother dredged the shells from their village rice field. It earns a welcome 40p. "My family grows only enough rice for six months," he said. "So when we're not planting or harvesting we collect bomb scraps. It's scary, but we've no choice."

The trade is so lucrative that scrap dealers ferry collectors by truck to virgin forests every day. Sypha Phommachan, 45, need not to go to such lengths. Farmers around Thajok village beat a path to the scrap dealer's door. A pile of fragments, casings, and mortars is all she had left after the foundry took away nearly eight tonnes a few days before.

"That took me about three weeks to collect," she said. "That's quite slow because it's the rice harvest season and people are busy farming. In a couple of months they'll be out furiously collecting to raise cash for the Hmong festival." Yet she carefully inspects the bomb harvest, rejecting live munitions. She knows the risks. In the six years she has lived in the village, 10 people have been killed collecting scrap. One 50-year-old man died three months ago when he tossed half a "bombie" he believed safe into the wicker basket on his back. It exploded and the ball-bearings it threw out went clean through his chest, killing him instantly.

Today's treaty banning the stockpile and use of cluster munitions is due to be signed by 107 countries - including the UK, which has been the third biggest user. Those holding out include the US, China, Russia and Israel.

But Richard Moyes, co-chair of the Cluster Munition Coalition, is confident that the convention will change the climate. "We sense we'll see a dramatic decline in cluster munitions use even among states that don't sign."



* Letters for publication should be sent to: letters@guardian.co.uk

* If you need help using the site: userhelp@guardian.co.uk
* Call the main Guardian and Observer switchboard:
+44 (0)20 7278 2332

[tigerryan]

War is bad but if your going to fight one your going to want the ability to suppress with cbu's If you think you don't need them I hope Im not on your side when your getting overrun. I just got back from Tcehpon/Zepon (bombed into the stone ages as I was told) Laos and I can tell you that the CBU delivery housings make some really nice herb garden planters. Loosing an arm to a uxo would suck but I think if the folks would leave that s++t alone they would not have a problem with it It. To bad that they don"t have a better economy but I guess they got what they wanted at the end day. I would teach my kids not play with that stuff and police up the back yard.

[Astana]

If you map the presence of UXO in Laos, and overlay that with a map of poverty, you will find almost a 100 per cent match.

In other words, the most heavily contaminated areas are also the poorest areas of the country, and that means that those who are at the receiving end of this are those who can least afford to be at the receiving end, because they're the poorest of the poor, and poverty is extreme in this country, with almost a third of the population living below the poverty line.

Laos is the one country in the world which has had the largest number of bombs dropped on it, and there are still many unexploded devices in Laos. According to some projections, it'll take around 900 years at the present rate of clearing to get rid of all that unexploded ordnance.

Clearly, the country who dropped this ordnance should clean it up and pay for it.

[Laan Yaa Mo]

This is an interesting point and problem. At the moment I can think of five governments that were responsible for the bombing. The fifth one, the Royal Lao government, no longer exists.

However, the Pathet Lao were working to overthrow the Royal Lao government sometimes led by the neutralist Suvanna Phouma, and the sometimes rightist coalitions of Viang Chan and southern Lao elites, which brought the U.S.A. into bombing not only the Pathet Lao positions, but mostly trying to bomb the Vietnamese troops who were using the Ho Chi Minh trail to attack South Vietnam and to support their allies, the Pathet Lao.

I believe the Thai government also flew bombing missions into Laos, but maybe these flights were destined for Vietnam.

Thus, there are four active governments responsible for this mess: the Pathet Lao, the U.S.A., Vietnam and to a very minor extent, perhaps, Thailand.

[Astana]

In an ideal world the countries that dropped ordnance on Laos would provide proportionally the amount of money necesssary to clean up their proportion of the dropped ordnance, verifiable through their military records office. However, as we don't live in an ideal each country blames each other, records are lost (destroyed), memories become hazy on the subject and little gets done in a systematic fashion, leaving the NGO's to try and make headway on limited budgets etc. etc.

However, it is clear that the main dropper of ordnance was the USA

"Laos has the unenviable distinction of being the world’s most heavily bombed nation. During the Vietnam War American aircraft dropped 2 million tonnes of ordnance – more bombs than fell over Europe during the whole of the Second World War. The trouble is 30 per cent of the cluster bombs failed to detonate and therefore still saturate the land" (http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Campaign2.pdf).

It’s appalling to think that the Americans spent $2 million a day on the air war over Laos but now
spend only $2 million a year to help clear up their mess. And no... I don't dislike Americans and have no axe to grind with them, however, this is clearly a legacy that won't go away and is the proverbial thorn in the lion's paw.

[tigerryan]

Let the Lao people continue to do it, they actually enjoy the scrap and they have qualified teams to do it plus they need the work. My unqualified assessment of the uxo in Lao is that if they would just quit trying to saw the sh*t in half with the entire family watching it would not be a problem.

[Astana]

Reasons for UXO accidents:

30% Playing with UXO
21% Working in the fields, digging and hoeing
15% Cutting trees
10% Making fires in the garden
06% Looking for food
05% Grazing animals
13% Other, including bystanders

Sources:
Fact sheet, UXO Lao (2001).
Rae McGrath, Cluster bombs, Landmine Action (2000).
Jim Monan, Curse of the bombies, Oxfam Hong Kong (1998).
Sebastian Taylor, Community Awareness, MAG (1997).
Living with UXO, Handicap International and UXO Lao (1997).

[Laan Yaa Mo]

The Americans did not drop so many tons of bombs in Laos without reason. The reason they dropped the bombs, in the first instance, was to help the Royal Lao government, and themselves, attack Vietnamese who were using Lao territory to transport men and munitions into South Vietnam. And the U.S. wanted to punish the Vietnamese via the bombing campaign. It might have been JFK who felt that Laos had to be defended at all costs (I am not sure and am trying to write this based on memory without any real facts before me).

In addition, the Vietnamese army did more fighting against the Royal Laotian army than did the Pathet Lao forces.

IIt is true that both the U.S.A. and Vietnam broke the Geneva Convention terms not to interfere in the internal affairs of Laos.

Based on this fact, it might be argued that both the Americans and the Vietnamese are equally guilty of the bombing mess in Laos. In other words, if the Vietnamese had not broken the Geneva Accords and used the territory of Laos as a highway for their troops, there would have been no need for the U.S. to carpet bomb Laos.

It might be noted that the Vietnamese army attacked and eventually forced many of the people living in the mountains (especially the Hmong) to leave their homeland because they supported the Royal Lao government, and the American mission in Laos.

How do you put a dollar figure, and apportion blame, based on one side using massive amounts of soliders and the other side using massive amounts of bombs?

For the moment, the U.S.S.R. and China have been left out of the discussion; however, it is clear that they also supplied the communist side (Laos and Vietnam) with supplies that eventually led to the American bombing campaign. Thus, some of the dirt from the bombing in Laos should stick to the Soviets and the Chinese too.

Laos was not just about one landlocked country in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, it got dragged into the Vietnam conflict despite the best efforts of Souvanna Phouma to keep it neutral, and the wider U.S.-U.S.S.R. global geopolitical struggle.

To ask the U.S. to bear the brunt of the cost of the war, and the bombing, without acknowledging the part played by these other countries hardly seems fair. Let them all help Laos. They were equally guilty.

[Astana]

The New York Times book reviewer Drew Middleton sums up the technicalities of that era in this review (see below), consequently your memory has stood the test of time well (no mockery intended whatsoever).

However, the legacy of decaying ordnance and UXO accidents live on with a generation not born of that time and it seems that it is all but forgotten except for those of us who remember. Who eaxactly is to blame should have come out during the Paris peace talks but I imagine that all protaganists just wanted to end the conflict and such blame would of course be left to historians and forum members like ourselves using our powers of 20/20 hindsight.

Of the many books written about United States involvement in Vietnam, too many of them highly emotional, few have been as incisive and revealing as ''The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War.'' Basically it is an indictment of successive Administrations for failing to enforce the Geneva accords of 1963 to neutralize Laos.

The result, well documented by Norman B. Hannah and the blood of thousands of American and South Vietnamese soldiers, was that North Vietnam was able to use eastern Laos and Cambodia for the Ho Chi Minh Trail, down which poured troops, guns, ammunition and other supplies during the entire war. The trail was bombed, but bombing never stopped the movement southward for long.

Two other errors in American policy-making should be noted. Mr. Hannah mentions but does not emphasize Washington's sensitivity to China's reaction to American operations in Vietnam. It is too often forgotten that for most of the Vietnam War, China was going through the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution, which turned its already unsteady society upside down, and was totally unprepared for a war against the major power.

The second error was President Johnson's conviction, against the evidence of his own intelligence services, that the United States was fighting the Viet Cong in a local insurrection in South Vietnam rather than the well-armed, well-led forces of the North. In time, Mr. Johnson realized his mistake. By then it was too late.

The author holds that the original error, from which others developed, came when President Kennedy and W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State at the time, agreed tacitly to the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos. That country's neutralization had been negotiated with the Soviet Union.

But then the Russians helped the North Vietnamese build an invasion route into South Vietnam that was the major strategic communications factor in the war.

Interdiction by air power did little. Mr. Hannah writes: ''Despite the intensification of interdiction, the infiltration of men through Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam increased from 12,400 in 1964 to 37,800 in 1965, to 93,100 in 1966 and to 103,100 in the year ending December 1977, just one month before the Tet Offensive.'' I thought the Tet offensive was before this time - 30 January and 23 September 1968. my italics

The United States by this time was increasing the size of its own forces to raise the price of North Vietnam's aggression. But there was no sign of a fresh American strategy that saw the major problem. As the author puts it, ''Least of all did anyone propose creating an effective shield against the continuing slow invasion that had made the Tet Offensive possible.''

Militarily, it would have been possible. Politically, in the post-Tet climate in the United States, any major offensive operation, and this would have to had to be a major operation, would have caused near-chaos.

We are indebted to Mr. Hannah. He is not a lively writer. But this is a serious subject, seriously and sincerely treated by a well-informed man. It is one of the most reasoned explanations for our military failure in Vietnam. Published: December 29, 1988

[Laan Yaa Mo]

Thanks for the interesting review by Middleton.

He might have added that not only was China going through internal chaos thanks to the Cultural Revolution, but it was also having foreign relation difficulties with the Soviet Union. Thus, food and military supplies destined for North Vietnam by railway from the U.S.S.R. were sometimes hijacked by different factions in the Cultural Revolution to be used against another faction (the radical faction vs. the 'save the emperor' or 'fart' faction as Mao termed them).

Furthermore, it was very clear at this time that the Soviets and the Chinese no longer trusted nor liked one another as could be seen in the Red Guard attacks on the Soviet Embassy in Peking. The street running near the Embassy was renamed 'Revisionist' Street. More vocal banter between the communist giants could be heard at meetings of Communist states one of which was cancelled after Chou En-lai tried to orchestrate it into an anti-Soviet rally.

Ping Pong diplomacy was soon launched to the dismay of the Vietnamese, the Soviets, the Japanese and the Taiwanese (Formosans) among others. This is one of Nixon's and Mao's great achievements...the Shanghai Accords that is, not creating anger and dismay among non-participants.

Fairly early on in the Vietnam War, the Americans made it known to the Chinese (perhaps through Poland) that they did not want the war to extend to China. At this time, Mao thought the U.S.A. would get tired and go home.

Later, Mao was worried that the Americans would pull out of Vietnam too early for his liking. The Great Helmsman preferred a divided and weak Vietnam much like Stalin wanted the Red Army to halt at the Yangtse River leaving Chiang K'ai-shek ruling China south of the Yangtse, and Mao ruling from Peking.

Stalin always seemed to have preferred 'the peanut' (Chiang K'ai-shek) to Mao. Mao was always too independent and did not think the Comintern understood China (think Mikhail Borodin among others). Mao wanted Chinese solutions to Chinese problems. Consequently, Mao did not listen to Stalin this time, and drove the remnants of the K.M.T. army to Formosa. Another part of the K.M.T. took up residence in northern Burma, which was not appreciated by U Nu. However, the C.I.A. seemed to like General Li and his K.M.T. soldiers.

Funny about Johnson. I remember him standing in the rice-fields lecturing the South Vietnamese about democracy and calling it 'the chief coonskin on the wall' owing to the success village democracy initiatives had made under the tutelage of American professors like Samuel Huntington.

The Vietnam War was odd at times and the key role played by American academics in South Vietnam was really strange.

[Astana]

Coming back to your point regarding the equality of guilt, I do not think it is a sustainable argument to share the blame so-to-speak, since to my mind, the United States Senate hearings relating to the effectiveness of the air war and the results of bombing as succinctly put forward in the senate hearing report conclusion below, declares otherwise. Although the Senators do not go as far as to assign blame in an overly moral sense, they certainly do damn the campaign as a strategic flop that did nothing to stop eventual defeat.

Clearly the results of the bombing did nothing to alter the defeat of the United States and the ultimate victory of the Northern nationalists with the 'Red Flag' flying over Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City) as it does to this day, in fact the complete report is an indictment of US foreign policy and therefore places the blame for the bombing squarely on US decision makers of the time, who were leading the invading forces.

"This study of the effectiveness of the air war against North Vietnam in achieving the goals set for it by those involved in making the bombing policy necessarily neglects many relevant considerations. These include civilian casualties, the international impact of the bombing, the risks of escalation and provoking Chinese or Soviet intervention, the costs of the bombing, captured airmen, and the consequences within the United States. But in so doing, the study places in a starker light the high hopes held out for the bombing and the small results actually achieved.

Throughout the war, the results of the bombing of North Vietnam and its satellites (Laos, Cambodia) have consistently fallen far short of the claims made for it. The bombing began with the expectation that it would break the will of the enemy—although many questioned its capability to do so. When Hanoi showed no signs of weakening, the rationale shifted toward interdiction, but this goal, too, proved unobtainable. Many suggested that this failure was because there were too many restrictions. If such targets as the North’s petroleum facilities were attacked, it was argued, Hanoi’s capabilities would be sharply reduced. But again North Vietnam proved capable of adapting; the will of the Hanoi leadership held strong. Again bombing failed to fulfill the promises made for it.

This study should contain two warning notes. First, the focus of this study has been on interdiction and strategic bombing of North Vietnam during the period 1965-1968. It does not consider tactical air support, which has been relatively successful in achieving its goals. Neither does it consider the current air war against North Vietnam, which is far heavier than previous offensives. No reliable information is yet available on its success or failure.

Second, the experience in Vietnam cannot be readily transferred to other situations. In overcoming the effects of the bombing, the North Vietnamese have had certain advantages which may not apply to other cases. The leadership has shown great tenacity and high motivation, as well as exceptional ingenuity and adaptability in coping with the effects of the bombing. The evident control and organization of the society, together with apparently high popular support have made possible this tenacity and adaptability. Equally important has been the willingness and ability of other Communist countries to provide sufficient military and economic aid. The location of North Vietnam has also been of considerable importance. Bordering on an ally, China, North Vietnam could not be blockaded; land transportation routes were available. Moreover, the proximity to China long tended to moderate US escalation of the air war because of the fear of Chinese intervention. The common border with South Vietnam and the relatively unpopulated and heavily foliated border area with Laos facilitate infiltration and make interdiction bombing more difficult. The original guerrilla nature of the war long reduced the amount of supplies which had to be infiltrated, thus reducing the burden on the North. And finally, the underdeveloped nature of the Vietnamese economy has provided relatively few valuable targets for bombing.

These caveats notwithstanding, this study calls into serious question the efficacy of strategic and interdiction bombing against a highly motivated guerilla enemy in an underdeveloped country. Bombing appears capable of raising the costs of war to an enemy in such a situation, but it cannot be depended on to weaken his will or to substantially reduce his activity by interdicting his supplies. Compared to the damage to US prestige and the internal division created by the bombing policy, its meager gain must be seriously questioned."

Source:

Bombing As a Policy Tool In Vietnam: Effectiveness

Image of Bombing As a Policy Tool In Vietnam: Effectiveness cover.92nd Congress, 2nd Session
Committee Print

BOMBING AS A POLICY TOOL IN VIETNAM & SATELLITE COUNTRIES: EFFECTIVENESS

A STAFF STUDY BASED ON THE PENTAGON PAPERS
Prepared for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate

Study No. 5 October 12, 1972

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. Government Printing Office Washington: 1972
82-291 O

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J.W. Fulbright, Arkansas, Chairman

John Sparkman, Alabama
Mike Mansfield, Montana
Frank Church, Idaho
Stuart Symington, Missouri
Claiborne Pell, Rhode Island
Gale W. McGee, Wyoming
Edmund S. Muskie, Maine
William B. Spong, Jr., Virginia

George D. Aiken, Vermont
Clifford P. Case, New Jersey
John Sherman Cooper, Kentucky
Jacob K. Javits, New York
Hugh Scott, Pennsylvania
James B. Pearson, Kansas
Charles H. Percy, Illinois

Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff
Arthur M. Kuhl, Chief Clerk

[rufus]

tigerryan I can't believe your two posts. Firstly it is Sepon. I woprked there with, not as, mine disposal experts. It is a dangerous, filthy job. The cluster bobms are small and look like toys; they are very easy for kids to pick up. It is in fact the cluster bombs the size of a small ball that cause the loss of legs , arms and lives. These weapons were designed to kill and maim - nothing more.

I really can't believe how insensitive your post is. Have you seen kids with missing limbs in sepon? No? You didn't look too hard.

[aznyron]

well I don't recall declaring war on Lao but I agree with you rufus when children get hurt and killed
I think it USA personal responsibility to clean up the bombs that they dropped during the Vietnam war
in Lao and I would go as far as cleaning them up also in Vietnam we have the professional people to do
the job Happy New Year

[tigerryan]

Rufus, first of all I am right the name is Mouang Xepon, I will call it Tchepone because that what it was called during the war and thats what you need to call if you want anyone that was involved in the war want's to know what you are talking about. (AKA the "big X" named by the pilots for the rivers that meet there on highway 9 about 30 miles west of the Vietnam border ) I am looking at a picture of Mouang Xepon and me standing next to the friking town sign a month ago. You can call it what you want its not the point. The purpose of the CBU's was to take the troops out manning the anti aircraft guns that was hosing our planes down . If the NVA and the Pathets would have stayed on their guns and taken it like a man the job could have been done with 500lbs the problem was that when the jets went in on there bomb runs they jumped for cover so it is actually their fault we needed so many CBU's to kill them. I can teach my children to not play with knives,snakes, run with scissors etc. I will argue that many of the fatalities involved with CBU's are from people trying to recycle the metal for evil capitalist greed and profit gee no column for that in the anti war statistics. I would support some type of pay for performance remediation of the UXO by Lao nationals (actually we don"t have the available personell to do the job they are a bit busy at the moment) but I also support the past and future use of CBU's. UXO is a downstream problem you need to live through the day to worry about cleaning it up and if you ever needed CBU's "danger close" you might agree.

[tigerryan]

Rufus I was a grunt so I am not up on fly boy toys but I have seen US CBU's Vietnam era munitions and they look like a grapefuit with opposing seargent stripes that I understand that helped them spin and arm. They US CBU's dont look like toys to me they look like friggin round bombs. I have read that the soviets made some evil toy looking munitions but that aint what were talking about in Lao, am I wrong?

[Laan Yaa Mo]

This is a very old report...1972, and rather out of date. However, it does point out the divisions within the U.S. policy makers at that time. Some American officials felt that the bombing was highly effective, and somewhere it was written by a North Vietnamese official that they felt any more bombing of the north would lead to the communists seeking peace if the U.S. kept hammering the north. Perhaps it was in a review of Giap's biography. I cannot remember.

In any case, whether the bombing was effective or not is beside the point. If the North Vietnamese had not been transporting men and munitions along the Ho Chi Minh trail, and fighting battles for the Pathet Lao vs. the Royal Lao government, there would have been no need for a bombing campaign.

Blame for the campaign and the mess of the bombs still alive in Laos should be shared. Let the countries involved get on with the task of clearing Laos of these dangerous bombs.

[Astana]

The Fulbright report and the exposure of the Pentagon Papers was the one Senate report that stopped the bombing in 1973, it's impact at that time was taken that seriously.

On the issue of blame I cannot say that the blame should be shared, as my opinion remains steadfast in the belief that the heaviness of blame falls squarely on the United States for the protracted bombing of Laos during this time.

Interesting serious of posts Tilokarat.

Wishing you and yours a Happy New Year

[rufus]

It has been spelled Seopn and Xepon. As I said, I worked there for over a year. The cluster bomds that dot that area and Xieng Khouan look like toys, and they were dropped by the US. If you have the ability to teach young kids not to pick up toy looking devices good luck to you.
Also in Sepon and Xieng Khouan are very large Uxos. Some did not explode when they hit and lie buried. Farmers occassionally hit them with a plough. How do you stop that. I still find your post totally insensitive to the plight of the people there.

[Laan Yaa Mo]

Thanks and all the best wishes in the New Year to your and your family.

You have really tested my memory, and you are correct that the Fulbright Report was very important. I remember that it seemed odd for a Southern Democrat to be the one leading the charge against the administration, but Fulbright was an exceptional politician, or so it seemed at the time.

What took place in Laos was a tragedy of epic proportions. I really admire the career of Souvanna Phouma who did his best to keep Laos out of the conflict, but it was an impossible task. I don't think anyone has done a biography of him in English.

[BobHelm]

Tilo, Wiki has a small entry on him

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Souvanna_Phouma

But clearly say that they would like more information with some reference sources.

http://countrystudies.us/laos/

Also has a small reference to him, but mainly concerning 1957/8

http://www.answers.com/topic/souvanna-phouma

Has a pretty detailed 1 pager and agrees that there is no English biography.